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TOWARD ROBUST PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT: THE VALUE 
OF DELIBERATIVE DISCOURSE FOR CIVIL 
COMMUNICATION 
DON WAISANEN 
This article explores questions about "civility" in the 2012 election. Through 
an analysis of media discussions raising the term, four themes are constructed 
focusing on the limitations of civility discourse. While seeking to preserve the 
best that civil orientations afford, I argue that adding a deliberative approach 
to such discourse addresses moments when civil appeals appear to be most 
limited. This essay finds that working between civil and deliberative con­
structs provides an instructive perspective for understanding the workings of 
and possibilities for public discourse during situations when civility rhetoric is 
typically raised. Relative to civil communication-and associated concepts 
such as dialogue and advocacy-specific norms, benefits, examples, and im­
plications of a deliberative rhetorical vision are charted for problem-solving, 
public policy contexts. 
C
ivility is an important concept for public discourse. Few would 
want less rather than more civility in their interactions with others, 
and to some extent, the very viability of public discourse could be 
said to depend upon how such interactions take place. As Sigmund Freud 
once stated, the idea that "civilization began the first time an angry person 
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cast a word instead of a rock" surely resonates with anyone who has faced 
the pressures of physical or verbal assault.1 Robert Ivie similarly holds that 
"when politics reduces to hostility and contestation degenerates into war­
fare against an evil or otherwise dehumanized and despised internal and/or 
external enemy, democracy is lost. "2 In one of the most methodical defenses 
of the topic to date, Stephen Carter defined civility as "the sum of the many 
sacrifices we are called to make for the sake of living together,"3 which 
connects with the interests of rhetorical scholars exploring how certain 
forms of discourse can either advance or undermine democratic engage­
ment under conditions of disagreement and difference. 
In this spirit, there is much worth preserving about civility. If politics is 
about how people come together to address the challenges of communities 
and societies, the chief value of civil communication appears to lie in its 
common associations with respect. In public contexts, where there will 
always be deep1differences about how to engage political questions, individ­
uals have to communicate some degree of respect for others whose beliefs, 
values, or attitudes do not match their own to establish some grounds for 
problem-solving collaboration. With respect comes a recognition that there 
are others whose lives, needs, and well-being are implicated with one's own, 
and that in public settings, diverse messages and standards deserve spaces 
for expression. Without such respect, communicators run the risk of as­
suming their messages about politics can speak for everyone's demands, a 
task they surely cannot. Between respect and civic demands, I contend, we 
thus find civility: not simply respect for respect's sake, but expressions that 
others are valued amid disagreements over pressing social issues. 
While recognizing civility's importance to public affairs, however, any 
detailed investigation of the topic soon runs into a rather sordid back­
ground. Over 40 years ago, Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith outlined 
how "a rhetorical theory suitable to our age must take into account the 
charge that civility and decorum serve as masks for the preservation of 
injustice, that they condemn the dispossessed to non-being" and can "be­
come the instrumentalities of power for those who 'have."'4 In other words, 
any serious analysis of civility must also theorize how it can be used as a 
weapon, particularly when equated with universalizing, uniform standards 
of interaction that everyone is expected to follow under all circumstances, 
ignoring unequal relations of power, forms of appeal, and the differing 
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communication styles made available to and expressed by those of varying 
backgrounds, cultures, and belief systems. 
Surveying Mississippi slave owners' use of civility to resist challenge, for 
example, Raymie McKerrow argued that civility has historically served to 
perpetuate systems of oppression. In particular, mannered expressions 
between slave owners and slaves merely reinforced forms of social engage­
ment sanctioned and defined by those in power, doing little to change deep 
inequalities or the acceptance of "cultural other[s]." McKerrow concludes 
that pleas to "just get along" are hence insufficient for the kinds of complex 
social issues with which modem societies are confronted. 5 Exploring civility
during the Renaissance, Charles Taylor similarly demonstrated how no­
tions of" civilization" were used by those in power to claim it was something 
they had and others did not. Differences between elites and "savages" were 
generated through tame/wild and culture/nature binaries, with civility and 
ethnocentricity working side by side.6 Analyses of civility's role in gender
oppression, especially in depictions of women "as less civilized than men, "7 
in racial subjugation, 8 and in muting protestor' s demands by framing them 
as "out of control" have been further covered by other scholars.9 
Given these problems, a critical tension has developed in rhetorical 
scholarship over how rhetors should approach one another in the public 
arena. Nina Lozano-Reich and Dana Cloud contend that as much as civility 
may be called for, an "uncivil tongue" is necessary to liberate individuals 
and groups who are not on an equal playing field of discussion. 10 Respond­
ing to Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin's and Jennifer Bone, Cindy Griffin, and 
Linda Scholz's proposals for "invitational rhetoric" -a paradigm con­
structed from feminist literatures arguing for nonconfrontational dialogue 
rather than more direct efforts at persuasion11-Lozano-Reich and Cloud
argue that civil discussion "presupposes conditions of economic, political, 
and social equality among interlocutors" that are rare in everyday prac­
tice.12 They find the powerful have little incentive for inviting the less 
powerful to such discussions, so justice and equality tend to be advanced 
more by efforts at overt persuasion and explicit actions such as protests.13 
Both sides appear to agree about the types of actions that constitute invita­
tional, civil discourse (respectful words and gestures, for example) and 
underscore that civility is only one among many options in public dis­
course. But they each place different value upon the extent to which civil 
approaches can and should meet practical political demands. In particular, 
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a core concern is whether respectful dialogue or boisterous advocacy in 
pursuit of material social change should be the "desired ends of rhetorical 
engagement."14 
Working between these lines, rhetorical scholars have examined other 
times when exclusive concerns for civility have left political discourse 
impoverished. Christie Hurrell argues that "civil dialogue alone cannot 
ensure effective communication between governments and citizens."15
Christopher Darr finds "civil rationality" a U.S. Senate norm that "reveals a 
particular notion of argumentation that is impersonal and void of intense 
emotion," marginalizing "the role of character, ethics, and emotion, which 
can be vital in such debates,"16 and that might make for broader, more 
accessible forms of public communication. Continuing scholarship has 
engaged the question of whether polite engagement or rowdier forms of 
communication are generally best for democracy,17 with Thomas Benson 
concluding that, "civility and incivility are communicative, rhetorical prac­
tices. As such, they are always situational and contestable."
18 
To move these discussions forward, I examine recent media examples of 
civility rhetoric to tease out the types of meanings and connections public 
figures have drawn in their own use of the concept. This analysis will 
highlight the complexities of civil communication to demonstrate the worth 
a deliberative approach could off er such constructions. I will argue that a 
deliberative approach to public affairs offers the possibility of improving 
concerns for civil discourse itself. While seeking to preserve the best that 
civil orientations afford, working between civil and deliberative constructs 
generally provides an instructive perspective for understanding the work­
ings of and possibilities for public discourse during moments when civility 
rhetoric is typically raised. Relative to civil communication-and associated 
concepts such as dialogue and advocacy-specific norms, benefits, exam­
ples, and implications of a deliberative rhetorical vision are charted for 
problem-solving, public policy contexts. 
MEDIA DISCOURSE IN THE 2012 ELECTION 
In addition to exploring many journalistic reports, videos, and web mes­
sages from the 2012 election cycle, the author gathered systematic media 
data to capture a glimpse of the types of meanings in context(s) when 
commentators and advocates used the term "civility."19 Following Sarah 
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Sobieraj and Jeffrey Berry, who find that in political communication studies 
of civility/incivility, "the effects research exists alongside minimal data on 
the content of real political discourse,"20 a close reading of texts was con­
ducted. Per Edward Schiappa's insights, moreover, the analysis focused less 
upon "the" definition of"civility" than the meanings and purposes rhetors 
attached to the term.21 A Lexis-Nexis search of all Broadcast Transcripts 
with the term "civility" from July 1 to December 31, 2012, was used to 
identify how the term was discussed in the buildup to and aftermath of the 
election. 
To create a manageable scope (from 657 documents), the search focused 
on major U.S. news show transcripts like CNN and Fox News, which 
produced 1,551 pages with over 203 instances of the word "civility" ( 133 
transcripts total). "Civility" was mostly employed by Fox News (48 tran­
scripts); CNN came in second (29), and MSNBC third (19), with other 
networks like CBS and ABC following behind. Using Kenneth Burke's 
advice to trace words across a range of works and to look for "what goes with 
what" and "what is vs. what,"22 four aspects of "civility" emerged from the 
media transcripts, each of which assigns progressively less value to the 
concept. 
CONFUSING TERMS 
First, media discourse during the election highlighted much variance in the 
language around and about civility. As might be imagined, many pundits 
and interlocutors used terms such as "tone," "deference," "cordiality," "con­
duct," "respect," and "manners" in the context of "civility."23 But it was also 
positioned with self-deprecating humor, "compassion," and being friendly 
and "emotional."24 There was a reference to "humility," and even "tough­
ness with a smile" in the transcripts.25 The term was sometimes connected 
to more extreme, potential threats of violence, particularly in the context of 
2012 U.S. shootings, violence against cops, and as the opposite of, using a 
militant verbal antonym, "sniping."26 
The author conducted an additional Lexis-Nexis search of major U.S. 
newspapers during the election, and used the software program Concor­
dance to highlight statistical counts of each of the four words to both the left 
and right of the term "civility" across the papers (379 uses of the word were 
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found). This separate analysis further confirmed a notable diversity of 
concepts used in conjunction with the word.27 The significance of confu­
sion over what civility may mean partly lies in the term's instability in 
practice; that is, in how rhetors bypassed the different associations and 
purposes to which the term was put, potentially leaving citizens with little 
clarity about the term's usefulness for public engagement. But a confusing 
irony also emerged in how media commentators raised civility in discus­
sions of what better public engagement could look like while characterizing 
the concept as too limited or incomplete to help with such expectations. 
Some rhetors distinguished civility from constructs like "compromise," 
but left the potential relationship between these kinds of terms open-ended. 
One show covered what was described as Republican vice-presidential 
candidate Paul Ryan's "Midwestern nice" political style and mixed voting 
record in Congress. In response to Ryan's demeanor and record, the pro­
gram cut to a clip of Congressman Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) stating, "let's 
not confuse civility with a willingness to compromise,"28 before quickly 
moving on to another show segment. Beyond the question of how terms like 
"compromise" might relate to civility, Van Hollen promoted a sense that 
civility by itself is too weak to sustain a robust public discourse. That 
audiences could become "confuse[d]" by the invocation of "civility" when 
questions of compromise were at issue suggests that civil communication 
alone was seen as somehow too limited for this situation. 
On a brighter note, commentators like Mickey Edwards pleaded that "we 
have got to create incentives for civility, incentives for compromise, incen­
tives to listen to each other and to sit down together."29 Both civility and 
compromise are clearly valued in such statements, but further ways in 
which these concepts could relate also begged further insight. For instance, 
does civil communication require that one engage in compromises or, at a 
minimum, simply be ready to compromise at any point during discussions? 
And could civility ever require that one keep compromises to a minimum, 
say, to move an important, ethical cause forward? Media interlocutors 
raised a number of terms like compromise with civility, but in a relatively 
unexamined fashion that left viewers with some potentially confusing rhe­
torical tensions. 
Similarly, rhetors used civility with concepts like "partisanship" across 
the transcripts. 30 One commentator said that "one of the things that polls 
have showed is that people are really sick of partisanship and incivility in 
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Washington."31 In a reverse construction, a CNN chief White House corre­
spondent urged that politics needs more civility and "bipartisanship."32 
Both examples situate civility with terms of political moderation, apparently 
excluding an option that one could be both civil and highly partisan in 
public discourse. Overall, civility is constructed as needing another concept 
to fulfill its political potential and as possibly too weak to be sustained in the 
midst of vehement advocacy. 
Geoffrey Nunberg may have best captured the potentially confusing 
ways in which civility rhetoric can be used in remarking that "it's better to 
look at the word that we use in our daily lives to react to incivility and that 
reflects our genuine attitudes without being contaminated by all the ponti­
fication that a word like civility can evoke."33 Although Nunberg misses 
civility's virtues, such a charge evidences some desire to moor the concept 
with firmer grounding than public discourse appears to have, at times, made 
available. 
Finally, the relationship between civility and reason emerged as another 
confusing point across the transcripts. Whether civility is exclusively a 
matter of tone or shares some type of important connection with reason 
invited further inquiry. These two concepts were further focused by the next 
issue. 
SUBSTANTIVE DIVISIONS 
Commentators and advocates frequently conceived of civility and "reason/ 
substance" as separate issues across the transcripts. Covering the vice­
presidential debate, Jelani Cobb on MSNBC noted that "if you get past the 
issue of the civility and we get past the snickering and those kinds of things, 
Joe Biden was far and away more substantive."34 Cobb made civility and 
substantive points separate issues, with civility as a dissociated appearance 
divided from real reasons or reasoning.35 President Obama even seemed to 
loosely divide the two concepts: "I think that over time, people respond to 
civility and rational argument."36 In such cases, civility is seen as vital to the 
political process, but is either subordinated or separated from substantive 
argumentation-reducing civility to merely gestural or behavioral niceties. 
Like the confusing terms with which civility rhetoric can be invoked, 
divisions from substance highlight how commentators consider civility 
important but also lacking without other concepts. 
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In the transcripts, a division between civility and reason/substance even 
appeared to prevent debate. In a story easily missed during the election, 
Pastor Rick Warren of Saddleback Church in Southern California-who 
held a civility forum between John McCain and Barack Obama in 2008-
decided to not provide the same opportunity between Obama and Romney 
in 2012, "citing nasty campaign rhetoric. Warren says he's never seen more 
irresponsible personal attacks and mean-spirited slander."37 While Warren 
clarified that he did not think it would be fitting to be "civil temporarily"38 in 
such an environment, more remarkably, a focus on civility obscured a need 
to talk, even about civility in the election itself. Where civility is seen as too 
weak to carry a robust public discourse in other examples, Warren enacts an 
opposite consideration: incivility is constructed as too strong or excessive 
for viable communication, creating a rhetorical overflow that surpasses the 
possibility for substance and reasoning. Rhetors hence leveraged civil or 
uncivil terms as weak or dangerous to divide the concept from substantive 
issues. 
The results demonstrated that the word "civility" emerged the most 
across the Fox News transcripts and largely from pundit Sean Hannity. Since 
the Obama administration has frequently used the term in support of its 
policies,39 this finding may simply be a result of the network's typical 
commitment to oppose the president's rhetoric at every turn. In a media 
environment committed to such high percentages of opinion program­
ming,40 however, a rhetoric that persistently implies commentators are 
"substantive" could also function to create an impression that the network is 
conducting credible journalism. 
When a Democratic strategist raised the point that a much maligned 
figure in the national news had handled the controversy "with dignity and 
grace," Hannity quickly opined, "but the foundation of what she said was 
false,"41 raising a tension between tonal performance and substantive rhet­
oric. Hannity's use of the term "foundation" is instructive, in this regard, 
situating substance/reason as not only separate from considerations of 
civility, but as vertically deeper and hence more important than the implied 
shallower, surface-level horizon of civil communication. In a similar show 
segment, Hannity urged former Alaskan governor Sarah Palin to break 
down Joe Biden's vice-presidential debate performance. Palin stated 
Bi den's "ind ting-type rhetoric" would not appeal to "those who are rational 
American voters just wanting to deal with facts and [the] true state of the 
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union."42 Implicitly, Palin draws a similar distinction between Biden's 
uncivil, "inciting" style and substantive facts/policies to argue that he has 
failed on both counts, making civility only a matter of style or tone. 
FAKE CIVILITY 
Related to the last point, beyond constructing civility as merely stylistic, the 
transcripts evidenced the use of civility as "fake." Rhetors constructed the 
concept as either an unreal tactic or unreflective, emotional impulse that 
others use to cover for a lack of "real" understanding. Reacting to pundit 
Sam Donaldson's reflections on how Barack Obama won the election, 
conservative Michelle Malkin stated: "There he goes. The new tone and 
civility, I think he has been living in the D.C. bubble way too long and 
probably hitting the sauce too much."43 Malkin implies that Donaldson's 
"tone and civility" are a part of an unreal "D .C. bubble," where mainstream, 
liberal journalists are unreflectively civil but misguided. The trope of "hit­
ting the sauce" (a colloquial reference to drinking too much alcohol) rein­
forces a sense that calls to civility are being made in an unthinking haze that 
masks important political realities. Relative to the confusing terms and 
substantive divisions identified in this analysis, where many rhetors still 
tended to see civility as important, here civility becomes merely a worthless, 
mystifying tactic. 
Malkin further charged the White House with issuing "all of these lofty 
edicts about civility and coming together" to place a veil over its machina­
tions with big labor. 44 Under these terms, Malkin constructs calls for civility 
as a false means for procuring political advantages, and as an approach to 
avoid due to its potential for chicanery. At the same time, asserting "fake 
civility" represents the person making this charge as in control of a "real," 
uniform standard of interaction. Although there is a possibility that media 
commentators are simply viewing differing communication styles or forms 
of appeal than they are used to or would choose themselves, comments 
about fake civility function to cast them as bearers of universally "real" and 
hence "right" standards of interaction, reducing varying expressions of 
civility to a correct or incorrect, totalizing type of performance. 
In essence, such comments strikingly imply that offers of civility are their 
very opposite: civility cannot be trusted given its masking function and link 
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with a fake/real binary. Covering the first presidential debate, Chris Mat­
thews pronounced that "Romney, with all this cordiality and phony civility, 
talked to [Obama] like a lesser being and that drove the president crazy."45 
As demonstrated by commentators on both the political left and right, this 
type of fake/real rhetoric fostered a speculative focus upon individual can­
didates' performances and motives, with MSNBCs Rachel Maddow also 
remaining concerned about the "fake civility" and "phony" behaviors be­
tween the candidates.46 Pundits did not remark on how they made such 
calculations of fakery, however, characterizing civility's worthlessness and 
opponents' motives as largely self-evident. Seeing civility in terms of such 
fakery further illustrates the confusing terms with which rhetors used the 
concept. Where civility sometimes meant genuine gestures of appreciation, 
these examples focused upon civility as exclusively inauthentic. 
Along these lines, Palin engaged fake civility charges more implicitly in 
stating that "when I hear Barack Obama speak about ethics and civility, it's 
nauseating to me."47 Constructing civility as fake communication, Hannity 
was equally fond oflabeling Obama "President Civi�ity," a satirical moniker 
underscoring the extent to which the president's calls for civility were seen 
as bogus and never "real."48 Yet the questions might be asked: are all
discussions of ethics and civility by political figures one opposes simply 
unreal masks, as such comments appear to presume? At what threshold are 
media commentators able to decide that talks of ethics and civility are not 
really about ethics and civility? 
One standard of "inconsistency" was applied when Hannity argued that 
Obama tended to do nothing in the face of "violence"; for example, during 
the Occupy Wall Street movement's clashes with police.49 Hannity implied 
that Obama was inconsistent in not making a statement about these matters 
and hence did not really care about civility. As a means of intervening into 
and parsing out civility rhetoric's complexities, however, inconsistency 
seems unable to help Hannity and others distinguish between moments 
when civility should and should not be used-a point further focused by the 
next finding. 
RHETORICAL WEAPONRY 
A final theme emerged in the transcripts, namely, commentators' charges 
that "civility" is merely a weapon used to shut down speech or put others in 
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losing positions. An election discussion between Tohn Stossel and Bill 
O'Reilly about a University of North Carolina campus speech code high­
lighted this issue: 
Stossel: But when you have all these rules and they have a civility code 
which would ban you, then, what it means is they use them to punish people 
they don't like. And those are usually people like you. 
O'Reilly: Tell me about the Civility Code at the University of North 
Carolina 
Stossel: All speech must be civil. And, you know, that feels right. Why not 
have a nice speech[?} But the Civil Rights Movement and the protests sitting 
in a lunch hall and refusing to leave on a lunch counter because they're racist, 
it's important not to be civil all the time. 
O'Reilly: So, if I go down there and I call somebody a "pinhead," am I 
arrested by the campus police[?] 
Stossel: You, according to their code, would be kicked out of school. 
O'Reilly: Is that right. Wow. 50 
Rather than describing civility as a mechanism for inviting discourse, op­
positely, O'Reilly and Stossel' s conversation centers upon civility as a means 
of narrowing public speech to exclude disagreements. Stossel' s odd example 
of the civil rights movement (which leaves aside the movement's strategic 
"nonviolence" and "civil disobedience") and O'Reilly's point about calling 
someone a "pinhead" also assumes incivility is sometimes useful, a point 
begging a better understanding of when and why civility should and should 
not be used. More so, Stossel uses a dodging rhetoric in this construction, 
asserting that civility codes uncivilly overreach by excluding disagreeable 
forms of communication from debate-but Stossel also bypasses the social 
problems or substance/reasons intended to be highlighted through such 
codes. Different than the confusing terms and substantive divisions, where 
commentators typically positioned civility with or against other terms in 
efforts to distinguish but retain some of its value, civility needs little saving 
when framed as either fakery or a damaging weapon. 
Through these episodes, pundits characterized civility as a rhetorical tool 
that "they" use against "us," paradoxically to position one's own cause as 
superior. A sense of being a victim informs such exchanges, so that Stossel, 
O'Reilly, and those they purport to represent can be seen as swimming 
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upstream in the culture, regardless of their elite positions. In claiming this 
beleaguered status, the rhetoric functions to assert an oppression justifying 
the use of uncivil discourse, to associate one's cause with well-regarded, 
marginalized communities (in this case, the Civil Rights Movement), and to 
invite sympathizing audiences to become more politically active in a battle 
where apparently innocuous concepts like civility come loaded with strate­
gic manipulation. In a similar conversation with Newt Gingrich, Hannity 
rebuked the mainstream press for not covering the incivility of leftists.51 
Hannityand Gingrich implied that the very absence of attention to incivility 
was an indictment against liberal media coverage about the issue of civility 
itself. Many of these claims added up to the charge that others are really 
uncivil in the way that they use civility, calling into question the construct's 
value for public discourse. 
Yet calls for civility equally became a device for discussants to steer 
conversations away from actually talking about the particular issue(s) at 
hand. In another election period story, the owner of the Chick-fil-A restau­
rant chain ignited a national controversy through remarks about gay mar­
riage. Discussing the debate, one media interlocutor asked another: "can we 
not have some civility about someone having an opinion? And by the way, 
it's OK for you to disagree with whoever."52 In such remarks, one person 
perceives another as shutting down debate through civil freedoms that are 
not offered to him or herself. In making this rhetorical move, however, the 
same advocate uses civility as a means of both minimizing another's claims 
and diverting the discussion away from how such opinions were formed in 
the first place, creating stopping points for further communication. 
THE VALUE OF "DELIBERATIVE" DISCOURSE FOR CIVIL 
COMMUNICATION 
The preceding analysis provides a small window into some unacknowl­
edged tensions in the practice of civility rhetoric. Such discourses may 
certainly highlight examples of unwarranted rudeness, or of civility as a 
useful ideal and working standard. But media advocates often put civility 
rhetoric to oppressive work in, for instance, using the concept as a type of ad 
hominem attack, where one gains by attacking others' civility rather than 
the issues presented. At times, the often confused and unreflective dealings 
of media commentaries covering civility issues thus skirt more productive, 
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robust understandings of what might be possible for public reasoning and 
reasonability. 53 
In this spirit, while retaining the best that civility offers, there are distinct 
advantages to adding a "deliberative" approach to concerns for civil com­
munication. By making manifest how our understandings of the types of 
issues often raised by civility can be addressed through general and specific 
deliberative approaches, this section works toward a fuller framework for 
civil public engagement. Ultimately, moving between civil and deliberative 
approaches offers stronger conceptions for what more democratic forms of 
communication could look like. 
DELIBERATIVE: A GENERAL APPROACH 
To work between civil and deliberative communication, this section con­
structs a general definition of"deliberative" discourse. To do so, I must first 
turn to what others have meant by the concept. The idea that dialogue and 
civility share some kind of relationship has been articuiated by others. 
Carter's remark that "anything that interferes with dialogue is bad for 
civility" draws a relationship between these two notions.54 Yet, as noted 
from the previous analysis and prior research, sometimes civility rhetoric 
can be a way of interfering with dialogue. Others have provided closer 
bridges between civility and dialogue, with Ronald Arnett explicitly con­
structing "dialogic civility" as "an interpersonal metaphor grounded in the 
public domain and in a pragmatic commitment to keeping the conversation 
going in a time of narrative confusior. and virtue fragmentation."55 Nate the 
feature of "keeping the conversation going," a sentiment echoed in W. 
Barnett Pearce and Kim Pearce's normative construction of"dialogic virtu­
osity," a type of communication "that enable[s] people to speak so that 
others can and will listen, and to listen so that others can and will speak."56 
In theory and practice, finer distinctions have been drawn between 
concepts like "dialogue" and "deliberation."57 The National Coalition for 
Dialogue and Deliberation underscores how both constructs engage needs 
for social or material change, but dialogue typically involves a small-group 
process of simply sharing perspectives or experiences about issues that are 
difficult to discuss (such as racial inequity or gay marriage), with a goal of 
learning and understanding rather than argument or consensus.58 On the 
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other hand, deliberation typically has more of a public, instrumental focus, 
with participants sharing and exploring options to make decisions over 
pressing issues. Both dialogue and deliberation attend to constructing use­
ful norms for engagement, needs for inclusion and equality, expanding 
grounds for discussion, and "building civic capacity," however.59 
There is a burgeoning interdisciplinary literature on deliberative democ­
racy, although "deliberative" is still not a term much used in U.S. public 
culture. Scholars typically associate deliberation with problem-solving, es­
pecially where a variety of perspectives and positions exist on a public policy 
issue. Discussions of deliberative democracy raise the ongoing project(s) of 
Tilrgen Habermas and his scholarly following to construct and advance 
open, reasoned communication norms and forms of argument fitting for a 
democratic politics, while critiquing the forces working "to depoliticize 
public communication" in and across societies. 60 
Some examples from this line of inquiry include the ways in which 
personal or technical arguments can be used to forgo or extend public 
communication practices, the constraints that the form or content of poiit­
ical language place upon deliberative ideals, the styles or setups of particular 
forums, or analyses of how some historical events have contributed to the 
loss of deliberative practices.61 Overall, the quest to advance better norms 
for deliberation is an evolving project, with varying research lines advocat­
ing for more cosmopolitan practices or forms of "transcendent eloquence" 
that are contextually sensitive.62 Overall, deliberative democracy scholars 
focus on "what putting [deliberation] into practice would mean, or how it is 
possible under the social conditions of pluralistic and complex societies."63 
Rhetorical theorists have aligned themselves with this project, with a goal of 
"equip[ping] democratic citizens to become better rhetoricians" to promote 
more intersubjective and liberatory conditions for communication.64 
In general, public deliberation has been defined as "debate and discus­
sion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which 
participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new 
information, and claims made by fellow participants."65 It is "an uncon­
strained exchange of arguments that involves practical reasoning and al­
ways potentially leads to a transformation of preferences."66 As such, 
scholars have emphasized both a continual openness to others and a will­
ingness to revise one's own positions as critical to deliberative approaches. 
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Robert Asen adds the idea that "deliberation entails a meta-level of 
critical reflection that promotes perspective-taking, which is a form of 
recognizing difference."67 The taking in of others' perspectives and ability 
to work with difference play key roles in deliberation. In what may be the 
most important consideration, however, engaging in deliberative discourse 
means remaining keenly attuned to how "an advocate's discourse implicitly 
or explicitly widens or narrows discursive space for others."68 In other 
words, like Habermas's concern for highlighting norms that advance or 
detract from reason and reasonability in society, deliberative discourse 
manifests a continual concern for how and when space is opened and closed 
for others in acts of communication. Deliberative communication consti­
tutes the kind of "rhetorical culture" Thomas Farrell characterized as "an 
institutional formation in which [the] motives of competing parties are 
intelligible, audiences available, expressions reciprocal, norms translatable, 
and silences noticeable,"69 underscoring additional concerns for making 
discussions equal, accessible, and attentive to power relations. 
Out of this background (and for reasons of parsimony), I will define 
being "deliberative" generally as making broadly informed judgments with 
an unending openness to others' communication when evaluating different 
perspectives and positions oriented toward a public policy problem. Beyond 
being civil, engaging in deliberative discourse recognizes how communica­
tion acts to open and close space for further communication. For example, 
an individual could be very passionate about a cause like gun control, but 
still open to others' communication. Given the information that this indi­
vidual has taken in to this point in life, he or she may make a policy 
argument such as "the federal government should create a law banning 
assault weapons." In coming to this conclusion, this person narrows com­
municative space to make a judgment; she or he is no longer searching for 
answers and is at a decision point. But if this judgment is made with the idea 
that others' communication could still impact her or his belief(s) about the 
policy problem, we could say that this individual is engaging in "delibera­
tive" discourse. Given what is thought to be an overwhelming accumulation 
of evidence in support of this policy conclusion, passionate, even angry 
arguments or ways of arguing could still be warranted, so long as this person 
maintains some space for others' points of view. This rhetorical theory 
accounts both for the processes and products of communication, construct­
ing room for vigorous, expansive deliberation and decided advocacy-
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never losing sight of both but always leaving some space open for further 
communication to potentially alter one's positions. 
Under these terms, I would suggest that one's civil behavior should be 
seen as an important part of this deliberative approach, or how a person is 
opening or closing space in and across communicative acts. Across many 
situations, civil communication is likely to be the best default position to 
open space for others and communicate one's orientation for broadly 
informed judgments. Yet a deliberative approach to public discourse need 
not be reduced to civil communication. From the preceding example, if we 
were to judge the angry gun control advocates' way of arguing in light of 
typical understandings of civility, we might be tempted to reduce this 
individual's communication to their tone or manner. But from a delibera­
tive standpoint, the possibility that the anger is coming from a broadly 
informed judgment in accord with what that person argues they know 
about the issue should be noted. Space could still be left open for other, 
different points of view to quell that person's current, justified anger. 
In this sense, being deliberative rather than simply civil would have us 
seriously consider all our stopping points in political matters-even the ways 
our characterizations of others' civility could be stopping points for com­
munication-with both practical and ethical implications. As the rhetorical 
tradition has long heralded, human beings have to make practical judg­
ments every day with less than complete information; for example, should a 
person choose to vote yes or no on a particular state proposition? The 
making of broadly informed judgments takes seriously the need for tenta­
tive conclusions in contingent political affairs, but engaging in deliberative 
discourse means never completely foreclosing the possibility for more com -
munication to amend one's viewpoints. For scope, this general definition of 
"deliberative" discourse is being restricted to public policy contexts involv­
ing problem-solving. It could perhaps inform other domains of human 
experience, such as religious or interpersonal spheres;70 but this analysis 
leaves aside such applications to focus exclusively upon how deliberative 
communication could apply in political, problem-solving debates. 
To be clear, where dialogue and deliberation are often associated with an 
exchange between individuals, my definition of "deliberative" intentionally 
focuses more on the attitudes and approaches of an individual; that is, as an 
orientation for making individual judgments. This definition carries an 
Aristotelian bent, highlighting a need for civil orators before interactive 
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processes. Aristotle not only cast rhetoric as a kind of individual "ability, in 
each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion," but focused 
on the "deliberative speaker" who could best serve the body politic by 
aiming for an expansive knowledge of public issues ( which relates to the 
"broadly informed" part of "deliberative") and other ethical norms like 
"many friendships and good friendships" ( which places some value upon and 
opens space for others with competing perspectives and positions on a 
problem).71 Similar to Aristotle's approach, "deliberative" describes an 
orientation largely preceding "deliberation" as an exchange between people. 
For any exchange to take place, individuals have to be even marginally 
deliberative with one another. An interaction in which two individuals are 
completely closed to one another from the outset is no exchange at all. 
A focus on "deliberative" discourse has the additional benefit of placing 
some accountability for deliberation in an individual's discursive acts, 
rather than primarily positioning the loci of deliberative action outside such 
enactments of citizenship, say, in a forum or in social structures.72 This is 
not to downplay that certain rules or procedures for deliberation-like 
asking participants to sit in a circle, take turns speaking, or paraphrase one 
another's arguments-could not foster deliberative orientations among 
individuals who initially appeared quite closed to one another. But such 
rules or procedures still ultimately target each individual's assent to being 
more deliberative with others than might be fostered under other condi­
tions. As an ethical matter, engaging in deliberative discourse hence recog­
nizes that no human is a god and that all political judgments are partial and 
beckon accountability, points explored further in the next section. 
DELIBERATIVE: SOME SPECIFIC QUALITIES 
To bolster the aforementioned, general definition of "deliberative," some 
specific planks provide further explanation and justification for a delibera­
tive orientation in public affairs: respecting human limitations, recognizing 
how one both exerts and is subject to power in acts of speaking and listening, 
and becoming comfortable with multiple identities in politics. As leveraged 
in the types of media discourses analyzed, constructions of civility have at 
times been too singular and minimalist to take these types of considerations 
into account. Each of these qualities underscores the process by which 
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broadly informed judgments that remain continually open to others' com­
munication might be made when evaluating public policy problems. They 
are not intended to be definitive, but rather offer additional senses for how 
stronger conceptions of political communication could be generated by 
adding a "deliberative" approach to "civil" rhetoric. 
Following from the preceding general definition, one specific quality of 
"deliberative" communication involves a respect for human limitations- or 
taking seriously the interpretive, linguistic, psychological, and critical rea­
soning problems to which human beings are prone. Deliberative individu­
als might maintain a sense for how the filtering aspects of human language 
inspire and effect action, how the problems of fallacies can hinder discus­
sions, and more broadly, how selective one's interpretations can become, 
opening or closing discursive space for others' perspectives at any particular 
time.73 In the media transcripts, Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) modeled one 
such deliberative moment in apologizing for some rude comments he made 
about fellow Senator Harry Reid (D-NV). Coburn reflected that "I always 
will, a little bit every now and then, make some mistakes in terms of my 
words,"74 acknowledging some of his rhetorical limitations. 
Without getting into the thicket of research pertaining to these matters, 
for now it is simply worth pointing out how much knowledge from social 
psychology and similar fields deals with these types of issues. Calls for civil 
communication warrant a broader rhetorical theory considering the prob­
lems of human processing highlighted by the confirmation bias-the ten­
dency of humans to search for information that confirms their prior 
beliefs-and social judgment and similar theories.75 While discussing im­
portant topics like civility, media discussions tend to be completely walled 
off from knowledge about the limitations humans face when thinking and 
communicating. A definition of"deliberative" discourse focusing on open­
ing and closing space for others assumes some capacity to make judgments 
without, for instance, overstating how one has come to such conclusions­
with a recognition that some space for others had to be opened to make a 
political decision in the first place. 
Along these lines, another specific quality involves recognizing how one 
both exerts and is subject to power in acts of speaking and listening­
essentially placing attention upon how either type of communication opens 
or closes space for others' perspectives. Discussions about deliberative 
democracy have focused on the kinds of power that can and should be 
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afforded in public acts. 76 We know that to speak is to wield a power in which 
others can be easily silenced. Yet listening as a deliberative capacity deserves 
more attention too, since Western communication research and practice 
has tended to emphasize speaking over listening.77 Deliberative discourse 
recognizes status shifts, always leaving open even the smallest of spaces for 
others. Such a "cognitive dedication to the word of the other demands ... a 
kind of inner abnegation. Without this inner renunciation the individual 
can only hold a dialogue with himself' -similar to what Martin Buber called 
an I-thou rather than I-it orientation to others.78 Power, in this regard, can 
be viewed as tied to choices to make communication public or private. For 
example, a group of environmental advocates could keep their interests 
( such as who their funders are) public rather than private during a debate to 
construct a more open, accessible, and accountable' communicative space 
for others. 
A conversation between Ed Schultz and John Nichols in the media 
transcripts highlighted a similar need, covering presidential candidate Mitt 
Romney's conference call to business leaders around the nation during the 
election, which urged executives to "make it very dear to your employees 
what you believe is in the best interest of your enterprise."79 In addition to a 
lack of public transparency about the organizations and interests funding 
such actions, Schultz and Nichols discussed the possibility that Romney's 
comments and the subsequent pro-Romney rallies set up by many corpo­
rate leaders around the United States were overly coercive, undermining the 
deliberative capacities of citizens to speak freely in their workplaces, or at 
least to not feel pressured by their employers to vote for a particular 
candidate.80 
From the general definition, a quality of deliberative communication 
further involves becoming comfortable with multiple identities-or the idea 
that one's civic identity should be a fluid construction. Much work on 
identity finds that human selves are "shape[d] through an ongoing pro­
cess ... forming a sense of self and then expanding or correcting that sense as 
we meet other selves. There is no such thing as a neatly defined, once-and­
for-all identity."81 In this light, the identities wagered in public affairs­
Republican, Democrat, health care advocate, lobbyist-can be viewed as 
commitments (akin to the "broadly informed judgments" part of the gen­
eral definition) subject to expansion or contraction based upon the infor­
mation and experience one has taken in to that point in his or her life, 
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subject to further interventions (akin to the "unending openness" 
highlighted). 
Given some popular understandings of identity, the connection between 
selves and more robust forms of deliberative communication could be easily 
misunderstood, so Neil Postman's explanation of "role-fixation" problems 
may prove helpful: 
We all know people who cannot transit from one semantic environment to 
another. Professors, for instance, are apt to remain Professors even in situa­
tions where none are required. And t11ere are Political People who see 
Significance in someone's ordering scrambled eggs. And there are Comics 
who are always "on." And Moralists for whom there is no joy anywhere, only 
responsibility. And Cynics who will never let themselves be awed, or let 
anything be revered. Such people may be said to be self- or role-fixated, and, 
what is worse, they are apt to assert their fixation as a virtue. These people 
think of themselves as having strong character, but really it's impoverished, 
single-dimensional, lacking the courage to try out new selves and thus 
grow.82 
From the standpoint of public discourse, this theory of identity takes 
seriously one's commitments, but also focuses on how reified selves can 
overly "close" space for further communication to amend and advance 
upon one's prior political choices. It is equally not a call to the other extreme 
of purely fluid, perhaps postmodern identities. Public affairs demand that 
we bring our selves and judgments to public processes-for example, dur­
ing an election, whether one chooses to be a Democrat, Republican, Inde­
pendent, or to make more implicit choices such as "apathetic voter" or 
"nonparticipant," identity choices will be made regardless. 
An additional virtue of a deliberative orientation is that it should make 
finding common ground in political matters more likely. If an individual 
cultivates a solidified identity of 'Tm a Republican" or 'Tm a Democrat" in 
her or his approach to public life, a univocal, unwavering politics in which 
space remains closed for others seems highly probable. If this individual 
became more comfortable with multiple political identities, however, such as 
seeing themselves not only as a "Republican," but a "sometimes Libertarian," 
"parent with schoolchildren," "consumer at a particular supermarket 
chain," and "member of a particular locale," one may start with a higher 
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likelihood of having common ground with others over a variety of political 
issues (empirical research also supports the idea that finding initial com­
mon ground is vital for social engagement).83 The media transcripts evi­
denced one such deliberative moment in Nancy Pelosi's (D-CA) argument 
against drastic federal tax cuts, which expanded her identity beyond "poli­
tician": "Do you have children that breathe air? Do you have grandchildren 
that drink water? I'm a mom and I have five kids .... As a mom, I was 
vigilant about food safety, right moms? If you could depend on the govern­
ment for one thing, it was that you had to be able to trust the water that our 
kids drank and the food that they ate."84 Becoming comfortable with 
multiple political identities does not guarantee that citizens will find com­
mon ground with one another, but it does highlight how public discourse 
that begins from broad political self-images could serve to open spaces for 
public communication before they are too quickly and unnecessarily 
narrowed. 
With an understanding of identity choices as opened or closed in acts of 
communication, this specific quality of deliberative communication attends 
to constructing civic identities that are broadly informed but not necessarily 
bound by arguments tied to the past, present, or future. McKerrow similarly 
argues that the ability to see beyond the present moment is critical to 
democratic communication: "It is a state, not of being in but of acting out of 
the world, not toward any one predetermined place, but to act toward the 
future in a manner that preserves the ability to move beyond the lines that 
define one's place at any moment in time."85 Always leaving some space 
open for further communication to inform the self presents opportunities 
to see differences with others as points for constant learning and empathetic 
role-playing. It is the type of "partial cosmopolitanism" called for by K wame 
Anthony Appiah, which aims both to take one's background and traditions 
seriously while becoming comfortable with an identity as a "citizen of the 
cosmos."86 
These three qualities are intended to be heuristic, deepening a primary 
question for deliberative rather than exclusively civil communication: is 
space opened or narrowed for others in act(s) of communication? To focus 
on the contribution these qualities might make to civil public discourse 
when evaluating a policy problem, let us return to the previous example of 
the gun control advocate who argues that the federal government should 
create a law banning assault weapons. With a respect for human limitations, 
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this individual may realize how human beings' egos can easily get wrapped 
up with an issue, and how extremely insular the groups within which one 
might be situated have become, so that his or her justified anger should also 
come with some interpretive humility. This person has important contri­
butions to make to public discourse, but she or he keeps one foot in the past 
and one in the possibility that present or future arguments could lead down 
other paths. Although angry, this person attempts to keep his or her inter­
ests public and transparent-they had a relative die in a shooting, for 
instance, or they come from a liberal family in which taking this position 
was easier than not-but still remain open to further investigation. At the 
same time, perhaps this person is currently in a position of power as an 
attorney, meaning that others' important voices or data from different fields 
are yet to be considered. Given what this individual views as a massive 
volume of evidence supporting gun control, he or she assumes the identity 
"gun control advocate" (or related forms of identity), but holds this com­
mitment as tentative to forgo making this civic self a fundamental stopping 
point for further communication. 
BENEFITS 
Returning to the four aspects of civility rhetoric highlighted in the media 
analysis, adding "deliberative" to "civil" public discourse brings several 
benefits more clearly into view. First, deliberative communication provides 
conceptual clarity for public discourse about civility. The manifold terms 
that are often brought to discussions of civility can be tested under a wider 
criterion covering the extent to which individuals make broadly informed 
judgments with an unending openness to others' communication. The 
focus on "broadly informed" and "unending openness" highlight that com­
municators should approach the larger public environment as openly as 
possible, but also that such well-informed and open orientations can rea­
sonably lead to relatively closed, passionate conclusions about public policy 
problems. 
The processes by which individuals and groups make such judgments 
configure civil with deliberative communication-a social movement's in­
civility could be productive in making a well-informed judgment about 
unjust economic laws, so long as some room is always left for more argu-
TOWARD ROBUST PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT 309 
mentation to influence present or future choices. As such, this theory 
accounts for terms of compromise and partisanship in a way that some 
forms of civility rhetoric may not. Under these terms, being deliberative 
functions as a generally applicable orientation for public policy problem­
solving, but also remains sensitive to the demands of particular contexts for 
which vigorous advocacy or other forms of communication may be appro­
priate. 87 An environmental coalition holding a company accountable for 
dumping toxic waste near a local community should be expected to use 
forceful protests in pursuit of its cause; thus, the "uncivil tongue" that 
scholars like Lozano-Reich and Cloud call for could certainly be war­
ranted. 88 Yet maintaining some openness to the possibility that the move­
ment could always be better informed about the situation still remains 
important. For example, perhaps the environmental coalition has been 
proceeding under the assumption that the whole company is at fault when 
the responsibility really lies with a particular manager and his team. In this 
light, Foss and Griffin's proposal for "invitational rhetoric" remains appli­
cable, and could keep the movement from becoming too hermetic in its 
public advocacy. 
Similarly, if civil rights leaders stage a sit-in to advocate for a new federal 
employment policy, or a health care reform group engages in a protest to 
reverse a state decision-both political contexts where problem-solving 
discourse among interlocutors appears hardly fitting-then such strategic, 
forceful modes of rhetoric might be expected. Protests may even be needed 
to garner public attention and get a problem recognized in the first place. 
But a deliberative orientation could still stand to inform such advocacy in 
the long-term by having the leaders and group remain open to the possibil­
ity that different perspectives and positions could provide alternate strate­
gies or future outcomes. The "strange bedfellows" phenomenon,89 where
political alliances and policy changes have been advanced by advocates who 
typically hold disparate positions, attests to the kind of value a broadly 
informed and continually open orientation could have in a range of political 
contexts. 
Second, civility and reason may become unnecessarily dissociated, so to 
some degree, "deliberative" attempts to transcend such divisions-by ac­
counting for how one's civility or incivility, reasons or lack of reasons-may 
open or close space for communication in public policy contexts. A broader 
range and repertoire of communicative acts are afforded for public rhetoric-
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meeting Darrin Hicks's challenge "to discover models of deliberative en­
gagement that do not require that citizens discount their passions, cultural 
knowledge, and deeply held convictions"90-moving beyond the kind of 
minimizing civility appeals highlighted in the media analysis, which tended 
to construct stopping points for further communication. 
Third, deliberative discourse works to circumvent potentially unproduc­
tive discussions about authenticity (or whether communicators are being 
fake/real). As bandied back and forth in media discourse, civility can be 
about another person or group's motives, with incessant speculations about 
intent, self-presentation, and other factors. In addition to manner and tone, 
"deliberative" focuses on important elements external to individuals as 
well-what "broadly" outside of a person is being brought to bear on public 
judgments, such as facts, sources, precedents, and so on-in other words, 
space for what others have provided the public discourse on a topic of 
concern. Most "data" are simply others' findings, and anyone unaccount­
able to data beyond their own may tend toward an individual or group 
solipsism that portends poorly for public affairs. Commentary need not 
focus so much on a political candidate's smile as authentically civil or not; 
rather, the candidate's viability can be assessed in terms of an overall 
orientation to make broad and continually open judgments accountable to 
further discourse, of which a smile could be considered simply one part. 
Last, deliberative communication should not be reduced exclusively to 
someone's tone or manners. With a focus on opening or closing communi­
cative space, we might identify how civility can be used to shut down speech 
or create stopping points for communication. In essence, part of my point in 
this analysis has been to demonstrate that civility should largely follow from 
deliberative discourse-the two are valuable partners in constructing robust 
public engagement. To remain unendingly open to others in communica­
tive acts presumes some degree of public rather than wholly private space, in 
which verbal or nonverbal gestures of reflection and respect are likely 
needed to create a shared space. At the same time, individuals should take 
seriously how such gestures could also become rhetorical weapons that 
forgo more broadly informed judgments. In either case, while upholding 
the best that standards of civil communication may offer, a deliberative 
criterion accounts for and addresses some of the rhetorical maneuvers 
enacted when civil appeals appear to be most limited. 
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CONCLUSION 
Civility is a vital concept for public discourse. It is surely better that people 
on freeways, in supermarkets, or ir. public forums largely remain civil rather 
than uncivil. But I find that a "deliberative" approach can account for and 
address some of the limitations civility rhetoric currently faces, construct­
ing a more robust civil discourse than might otherwise be afforded. Some 
may consider this project a recovery of some historical senses of civility, 
such as Aristotle's calls for civic friendship.91 I would not quibble with such 
assessments, but do find that civility rhetoric-as covered in scholarly 
debates and practiced in contemporary media messages-can sometimes 
obscure more than enlighten when it comes to stronger understandings of 
and practices for public communication, a problem that a deliberative 
orientation brings more sharply into focus. 
In one sense, deliberative discourse highlights how concerns for the 
differences between education and propaganda may be more important 
considerations than civility alone. Alex Carey says propaganda is "commu­
nications where the form and content is selected with the single-minded 
purpose of bringing some target audience to adopt attitudes and beliefs 
chosen in advance by the sponsors of the communications," whereas edu­
cation "encourage[s] critical enquiry ... to open minds to arguments for 
and against any particular conclusion, rather than close them to the possi­
bility of any conclusion but one."92 The propaganda/education dichotomy 
may prove helpful for thinking about deliberative communication, but it is 
also a bit stark since this essay's definition of "deliberative" finds room for 
single-minded purposes that can still remain open. Deliberative communi­
cation instead parallels more directly Wayne Booth's statement: "Whatever 
imposes belief without personal engagement becomes inferior to whatever 
makes mutual exploration more likely .... The process of inquiry through 
discourse thus becomes more important than any possible conclusions, and 
whatever stultifies such fulfillment becomes demonstrably wrong."93 
In this light, some typical ways of talking about politics may need 
revision. Once the election results were in, longtime political advisor Bob 
Shrum commented: "So what we are going to see tomorrow is more civility 
than you sometimes see after these elections" between the candidates.94 
From a deliberative standpoint, such comments invite us to consider more 
than just the manner with which interlocutors engaged one another, instead 
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asking whether efforts at open, informed persuasion took place both before 
and after the election. Similarly, there is a popular tale often told about 
former Republican President Reagan and Democratic Speaker of the House 
Tip O'Neill grabbing beers and being civil toward one another after work, a 
model of political friendship that commentators like Tom Keene and Bob 
Woodward invoked in the media transcripts,95 and that this essay would 
generally support. My analysis suggests that if Reagan and O'Neill were only 
being civil to the exclusion of deliberation, however, such recollections 
might be viewed in a different light. While recognizing the term "delibera­
tive" is not much used in current affairs, it can inform times and places when 
civility is being raised in a relatively unexamined fashion. 
At the same time, we should not underestimate how engaging in delib­
erative discourse can also go awry. Cass Sunstein's findings on the human 
tendency to engage in "enclave deliberation,"96 essentially becoming more 
extreme when having discussions in homogenous groups, present a clear 
challenge to such an ideal. Moreover, Stanley Deetz's work on potential 
deliberative illusions-whereby management can, for instance, have a 
meeting where everyone is allowed to have their voice heard but nothing 
ever really changes97 -presents an additional obstacle to enacting strong 
forms of public reasoning and reasonability. 
Yet both examples further focus the need to make broadly informed 
judgments that remain continually open to others' communication. Sun­
stein's findings rest upon groups' homogeneity, demonstrating how easily 
extremist problems can stem from antideliberative, "narrowly" informed, 
overly closed communicative spaces. In Deetz's example, the fault lies less 
with deliberative discourse than the need to remain vigilant about the 
different ways that communication can become less than "open" and ac­
countable. As Postman said: "The distinction between language that says 
'Believe this' and language that says 'Consider this' is, in my opinion, 
certainly worth making, and especially because the variety of ways of saying 
'Believe this' are so various and sophisticated."98 In other words, a deliber­
ative approach should still attend to the complex, manifest ways that stop­
ping points can be created through rhetorical acts-whether civil, 
deliberative, or other terms are being engaged. As Asen underscores, even 
calls for "counterpublicity" should be assessed in terms of how varying 
advocates can "restrict or expand discursive space for others."99 
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In a Wall Street Journal article after the election titled "Persuasion as the 
Cure for Incivility," University of Notre Dame President John Jenkins 
argued that better understandings of persuasion can sharpen civility's con­
tours. He stated that "we need to try harder to persuade one another-to try 
to get people to change their minds," since "much of the election campaign­
ing and much of the budget discussion wasn't designed to change anyone's 
mind, but instead to encourage people to believe more deeply what they 
already believed."100 Even attempts to have people acknowledge an excep­
tion or that a policy may not be so horrendous would be useful. In his words, 
"if we earnestly try to persuade, civility takes care of itself. "101 This closely 
related argument follows a similar path to the one pursued in this essay, 
although I find the concept of "deliberative" communication more useful 
than "persuasion" in asking us to balance efforts at changing one another's 
minds with a willingness to be changed. Ultimately, my hope has been to 
point in one direction that might bring more clarity to our understandings 
of this subject, while energizing and improving what is possible in public 
discourse. 
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